Née à Bruxelles le 3 juillet 1958, Françoise Forges a étudié les mathématiques à l'Université Catholique de Louvain. Dès 1981, elle se spécialise en théorie des jeux. Depuis 1995, elle est professeur d'économie en France.
Forges F. (2023), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information, Revue économique, vol. 74, n°2023/4, p. 529-539 
Sémirat S., Forges F. (2022), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single-crossing case, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 134, p. 242-263
Forges F., Sákovics J. (2022), Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm, International Journal of Game Theory, n°51, p. 589-605
Forges F., Renault J. (2021), Strategic information transmission with sender's approval, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 50, n°2, p. 475-502
Forges F. (2020), Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, Annals of Economics and Statistics, n°137, p. 3-30
Forges F., Horst U. (2018), Sender-receiver games with cooperation, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 76, p. 52 - 61
Forges F. (2017), Coopération en information incomplète: quelques modèles stratégiques, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 127, n°4, p. 467-493
Forges F., Horst U., Salomon A. (2016), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, n°1, p. 11-36
Eliaz K., Forges F. (2015), Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists, Economics Letters, vol. 126, p. 167-170
Forges F., Salomon A. (2015), Bayesian repeated games and reputation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, p. 70-104
Forges F. (2014), Interview with Jean-François Mertens (1946-2012), Macroeconomic Dynamics, vol. 18, n°8, p. 1832 - 1853
Forges F., Minelli E. (2014), Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 151, p. 605-606
Iehlé V., Forges F. (2014), Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 54, p. 1-6
Serrano R., Forges F. (2013), Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems, International Game Theory Review, vol. 15, n°2, p. 21
Forges F., Haeringer G., Iehlé V. (2013), Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 123, n°5, p. 663-696
Vida P., Forges F. (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, vol. 8, n°1, p. 95-123
Forges F. (2013), A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 78, n°1, p. 64-71
Forges F. (2013), J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice", Revue française d'économie, vol. 27, n°3, p. 19-34
Iehlé V., Forges F. (2013), Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization, Economic Theory, vol. 54, n°3, p. 449-461
Biran O., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 73, n°1, p. 52-64
Orzach R., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, n°6, p. 760-767
Forges F., Minelli E. (2009), Afriat's theorem for general budget sets, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, n°1, p. 135-145
Forges F., Koessler F. (2008), Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, n°89, p. 3-61
Von Stengel B., Forges F. (2008), Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 33, n°4, p. 1002-1022
Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Multistage communication with and without verifiable types, International Game Theory Review, vol. 10, n°2, p. 145-164
Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Long persuasion games, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 143, n°1, p. 1-35
Forges F. (2007), Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 117, n°6, p. 873-890
Barbar R., Forges F. (2007), Collusion dans les enchères : quelques apports des jeux coopératifs, Revue économique, vol. 58, n°5, p. 965-984
Forges F. (2006), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Theory and Decision, vol. 61, n°4, p. 329-344
Forges F. (2006), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26, n°2, p. 403-419
Forges F. (2005), The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities, Economie publique, vol. 2, n°17, p. 141-159
Forges F., Koessler F. (2005), Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 41, n°7, p. 793-811
Forges F. (2004), The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 47, n°2, p. 135-151
Forges F., Mertens J-F., Vohra R. (2002), The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects, Econometrica, vol. 70, n°5, p. 1865–1892
Forges F., Minelli E. (2001), A note on the incentive compatible core, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 98, n°1, p. 179-188
Heifetz A., Minelli E., Forges F. (2001), Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies, Economic Theory, vol. 18, n°2, p. 349-365
Minelli E., Forges F. (1997), Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 75, n°2, p. 388–406
Forges F. (1993), Some thoughts on efficiency and information, in Tani, Piero, Frontiers of game theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 357
Thisse J-F., Forges F. (1992), Game theory and industrial economics : an introduction, in Norman, George, The new industrial economics : recent developments in industrial organization, oligopoly and game theory, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 271
Forges F. (1992), Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum, in Hart, Sergiu, Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 2566
Forges F. (1991), Sunspot equilibrium as a game theoretical solution concept, in Barnett, William A., Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 492
Forges F. (1990), Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, in Tauman, Yair, Game Theory and Applications, San Diego: Elsevier, p. 64-76
Mertens J-F., Forges F. (1988), Stratégies d'entreprises et avantages de la coopération : l'apport de la théorie des jeux, in , Gestion de l'économie de l'entreprise : l'approche quantitative, Bruxelles: De Boeck, p. 492
Forges F. (2019), Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion, 72nd ESEM (European meeting of the Econometric Society), Manchester, Royaume-Uni
Forges F. (2012), Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games, PET (Public Economic Theory) 2012, Taipei, TaÏwan, province de chine
Forges F. (2010), Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory, Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography Workshop, Princeton, NJ, États-Unis
Sakovics J., Forges F. (2021), Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm, Economics Department Discussion papers series, 21 p.
Sémirat S., Forges F. (2021), Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval: the single crossing case, working paper GAEL, 36 p.
Forges F., Horst U., Salomon A. (2014), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, Paris, Cahier de recherche CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, 30 p.
Forges F. (2011), Bayesian games with contracts, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 14 p.
Iehlé V., Forges F. (2010), Essential budgetary information in revealed preference analysis, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine
