Curriculum vitae

Gordon Sidartha

Professeur des universités

sidartha.gordonping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 0623552317
Bureau : B159

Publications

Articles

Atal V., Bar T., Gordon S. (2016), Project selection: Commitment and competition, Games and Economic Behavior, 96, p. 30-48

We examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when the value of the project is the same for both firms. A monopolist rejects more projects, and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist. Duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior. We extend the model to allow for externalities, asymmetry, and n>2n>2 firms.

Gordon S., Riboni A. (2015), Doubts and Dogmatism in Conflict Behaviour, The Economic Journal, 125, 589, p. 1790-1817

We consider a conflict under incomplete information where two opponents fight to impose their preferred policy. Before the conflict, one opponent (the agent) trusts the information received by his principal. Under some conditions, the principal induces hawkish attitudes in the agent: the agent never doubts the optimality of his preferred policy, conflicts are violent, and bad decisions are sometimes made. Under other conditions, the agent believes that his opponent may be right, even when all evidence indicates that the policy preferred by the opponent is certainly suboptimal. In this case, the agent adopts dovish attitudes and conflicts are less violent.

Retour à la liste