Curriculum vitae

Carre-Tallon Martine

Professeur des universités

martine.carre-tallonping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 0144054644
Bureau : P131

Publications

Articles

Andrade P., Carré M., Bénassy-Quéré A. (2012), VAT and Mark-Up Variations: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Data Provided by French Exporters, Economie & prévision, 2-3, 200-201, p. 1-17

Nous étudions la manière dont les exportateurs d'un pays réagissent à un choc de TVA dans un pays de destination. Les chocs de TVA étant par nature quasi permanents, exogènes et sans impact sur le coût marginal, l'étude de leurs répercussions sur les prix permet d'identifier dans quelle mesure les taux de marge permettent d'amortir l'impact du choc sur les prix à la consommation. Nous montrons que même une hausse uniforme du taux de TVA peut induire une modification non-uniforme des taux de marge des exportateurs, et par conséquent des effets redistributifs importants entre les secteurs et entre les entreprises d'un même secteur. Le comportement de marge est affecté par les variations de l'élasticité de la demande adressée aux exportateurs, et dépend de la part de marché des entreprises.

We study how French exporters react to a VAT shock in a destination country. As VAT shocks are by nature almost permanent, exogenous, and without impact on marginal costs, the subsequent price reaction makes it possible to identify a pure demand-led mark-up adjustment. The results of an analysis of French customs data for 1995-2005 indicate a 67 % average mark-up adjustment for consumer goods. The adjustment is greaterfor companies, sectors, and destinations with a relatively higher market share. We then use our estimates and the Atkeson-Burstein (2008) theoretical framework to derive the distribution of mark-up adjustments of the various sector-destination pairs.

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Pisani F., Gasteuil A., Carré M. (2007), Etats-Unis, Japon, Europe,, L'économie mondiale 2008, Paris, La Découverte, p. 16-34

Carré M. (2007), Europe, la reprise de la croissance, in Bensidoun I., Chevallier A. (dir.), L'économie mondiale 2008, Paris, Éd. La Découverte, p. 26-34

Gauthier S., Carton B., Carré M. (2007), Impact sectoriel des allègements de charge, in Besson E. (dir.), TVA Sociale, Paris, La Documentation française, p. 135-144

Communications

Carré M., Riboni A. (2012), Unequal societies, Unequal Terms of Trade and Trade Policy, European Economic Association & Econometric Society, Málaga, Espagne

We consider a demand based theory along the lines of Murphy et al. (1989) to study the interaction between income inequalities and trade patterns. We analyze the effect of redistributive policies on the production patterns and welfare. We distinguish an intensive and an extensive channels through which an increase of demand - driven by redistribution or trade opening - leads to output growth inside a country and in its partner country. Trade between dierent countries (in terms of income or inequality) generates a modication of the demand distribution between sectors which impacts the industrialization process, the terms of trade and the welfare distribution within countries. Our framework hopefully provides a basic tool for studying the interactions between changes in taris on welfare and inequalities inside and between countries. We obtain non monotone relationships between the degree of inequality in the home country and the level of income of its trade partner. We can observe a U-shape or an inverted U-shape depending on, among other things, the relative size of the two countries. As a result the welfare eect of trading with unequal countries is ambiguous.

Belan P., Gregoir S., Carré M. (2010), Subsidizing low-skilled jobs in a dual labor market, European Association of Labour Economists 21st annual conference, Tallinn, Estonie

We introduce a matching model that allows for classical and frictional unemployment. The labor market is dual featuring low-skilled and high-skilled workers and simple and complex jobs. Simple jobs pay a minimum wage, while wages in the complex jobs are determined by Nash bargaining. Opportunities for low-skilled workers are limited to simple jobs; while high-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, and thereby can accept to be downgraded. We analyze the outcomes of simple job subsidy policies assuming that government budget is balanced thr ough taxes on occupied workers. We fi rst give conditi ons for the existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium and we then analyze the effects of different fiscal instruments. We show that in this set-up, increasing simple job sub sidies does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. By introducing heterogeneous skills and possible down-grading of the high-skilled workers, we show that the effectiveness of such policies in reducing the classical unemployment is decreasing. In fact, any additional classical unemployed re-entering the job market is accompanied by an increasing number of high-skilled workers downgrading to low-skilled jobs. We calibrate the model on French labor market data. It is found that for five low-skilled workers leav ing classical unemployment, two high-skilled workers are downgraded.

Bénassy-Quéré A., Carré M., Andrade P. (2010), Competition and pass-through on international markets: Firm-level evidence from VAT shocks, 59ème congrés de l'Association Française de Science Économique (AFSE), Nanterre, France

We exploit French customs' firm-level data to study how exporters pass a change in the VAT rate of one importing country through their prices. Looking at this reaction is of interest beyond a mere fiscal incidence analysis: VAT shocks provide instruments to identifying the extent of mark-up adjustment in exporting firms' reaction to macroeconomic shocks. Indeed, and by contrast with more usual shocks, typically exchange rate fluctuations, variations in VAT rates leave the marginal cost of exporters unchanged. For a sample covering exportations to the Euro-area over the 1996-2005 period our estimates show that, on average, markups contract by 50% of the VAT hike one year after the shock, implying a pass-through to final prices of 50% of the shock as well. We furthermore exploit the individual dimension of the data to show that the extent of mark-up adjustment varies across firms and markets. More precisely it depends on the market power of an exporter, as measured by its relative market share, and competition on a given market, as measured by standard concentration indexes. These evidences are in line with a model featuring variable elasticity of demand and heterogeneous firms.

Gregoir S., Carré M., Belan P. (2007), Subventions des emplois non qualifiés dans un marché du travail dual, LVe congrès annuel de l'Association française de science économique, Paris, France

Face à une forte exclusion ou un chômage important des travailleurs non qualifiés, des politiques de versement d'indemnités chômage ou de subvention des emplois non qualifiés peuvent être composées. Nous introduisons un modèle d'appariement dans lequel (i) co-existent des chômages frictionnel et classique, (ii) le marché du travail est dual. Les emplois non qualifiés sont rémunérés au salaire minimum, alors que les salaires qualifiés imposables résultent d'une négociation. Les travailleurs qualifiés peuvent postuler à tous les emplois et donc être éventuellement déclassés. Dans ce cadre, une augmentation des subventions des emplois non qualifiés à budget équilibré ne diminue pas nécessairement le chômage non qualifié ou sa durée. Une calibration sur données françaises illustre ces effets.

A large exclusion from the labor market or an important unemployment of lowskilled workers is observed in numerous countries that set a minimum wage. Unemployment benefit or subsidizing low-skilled job policies can be mixed to deal with this situation. We introduce a matching model where (i) co-exist classical and frictional unemployments, (ii) the labor market is dual. Low-skilled jobs pay the minimum wage, while high-skilled wages result from bargaining. High-skilled unemployed can apply for both types of jobs, while opportunities for low-skilled ones are limited to low-skilled jobs. In this set-up, increasing low-skilled job subsidies with a balanced budget does not necessarily reduce low-skilled unemployment or unemployment spells. The model is calibrated for the French labor market.

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