Curriculum vitae

Rojas Breu Mariana

Maître de conférences

mariana.rojas-breuping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 0144054665
Bureau : P124
Site web personnel

Publications

Articles

Rojas Breu M. (2013), The welfare effect of access to credit, Economic Inquiry, 51, 1, p. 235-247

I present a model in which credit and outside money can be used as means of payment in order to analyze how access to credit affects welfare when credit marketsfeature limited participation. Allowing more agents to use credit has an ambiguous effect on welfare because it may make consumption-risk sharing more inefficient. I calibrate the model using U.S. data on credit-card transactions and show that the increase in access to credit from 1990 to the near present has had a slightly negative impact on welfare.

Shouyong S., Berentsen A., Rojas Breu M. (2012), Liquidity, Innovation and Growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 59, 8, p. 721-737

Many countries simultaneously suffer from high rates of inflation, low growth rates of per capita income and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation and financial development. A novel feature of the model is that the market for innovation goods is decentralized. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquid funds to the innovation sector. We calibrate the model to address two quantitative issues. One is the effects of an exogenous improvement in the productivity of the financial sector on welfare and per capita growth. The other is the effects of inflationonwelfareandgrowth.Consistent with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large gains in the growth rate of per capita income as well as in welfare. Relative to reducing inflation, improving the efficiency of the financial market increases growth and welfare by much smaller amounts.

Berentsen A., Rojas Breu M., Shi S. (2012), Liquidity, innovation and growth, Journal of Monetary Economics, 59, 8, p. 721-737

Many countries simultaneously suffer from high inflation, low growth and poorly developed financial sectors. In this paper, we integrate a microfounded model of money and finance into a model of endogenous growth to examine the effects of inflation on welfare, growth and the size of the financial sector. A novel feature is that the innovation sector is decentralized. Financial intermediaries arise endogenously to provide liquidity to this sector. Consistent with the data but in contrast to previous work, reducing inflation generates large growth gains. These large gains cannot be easily reproduced by imposing a cash-in-advance constraint in the innovation sector.

Rojas Breu M. (2010), Welfare improving effects of inflation in an economy with multiple currencies, Revue économique, 61, 3, p. 657-666

Le taux optimal d'inflation demeure l'objet de vifs débats pour la théorie et la politique monétaire. La littérature qui se propose de rationaliser les cibles positives d'inflation choisies par les banques centrales se heurte à une critique majeure, du fait de supposer que seule une monnaie est à la disposition des agents. Cet article présente un modèle dans lequel l'inflation de la monnaie nationale peut améliorer le bien-être, tout en étant en concurrence avec une monnaie moins inflationniste et en l'absence de coûts spécifiques à l'usage de la monnaie concurrente.

The optimal inflation rate is an outstanding issue in monetary theory and policy. Previous work attempting to rationalize positive inflation targets chosen by central banks is subject to a major criticism, since its conclusions depend on the assumption that only one currency is available to agents. This paper presents a model in which the inflation of the domestic currency may have a welfare-improving effect, even though a less inflationary currency exists and no costs in using it are assumed.

Cartelier J., Rojas Breu M. (2009), Competition between inside and outside money : the two-circulation approach, Revue d'économie politique, 119, 6, p. 899-919

Le modèle présenté dans ce papier étudie les différents équilibres d'une économie dans laquelle les agents peuvent choisir le moyen de paiement, la monnaie externe ou la monnaie interne, à utiliser dans leurs transactions. L'approche défendue ici est différente de celle qui pense la concurrence à partir des fonctions d'intermédiation des échanges et de réserve de valeur de la monnaie. On peut interpréter la coexistence des monnaies en faisant appel à la conception « des deux circulations » présente chez Smith et Tooke : la circulation du revenu, entre entrepreneurs et salariés, et la circulation du capital, entre entrepreneurs. On établit que l'autorité monétaire a généralement les moyens d'imposer la monnaie externe dans la circulation du revenu quel que soit le choix des salariés mais non dans celle du capital. Si la moitié des entrepreneurs adoptent la monnaie interne, chacun deux aura intérêt à se conformer à ce choix quelle que soit l'action de l'autorité. Cette dualité de circulation est fondamentale pour expliquer l'équilibre désigné comme équilibre de Tooke : la monnaie externe est choisie pour la circulation du revenu, la monnaie interne, supposée moins coûteuse, dans celle du capital.

We present a model to analyze different equilibria that exist in an economy in which agents can choose the means of payment to use in trade ; i. e., inside or outside money. Our approach departs from the usual explanation of competition as a phenomenon related to money functions (means of payment and store of value). We interpret competition from the two circulations perspective, developed by Tooke and Smith : income circulation, between entrepreneurs and workers, and capital circulation, between entrepreneurs. We claim that monetary authorities can generally assure that outside money is used in income circulation transactions regardless of workers' choice. However, authorities cannot affect the means of payment used in equilibrium in capital circulation transactions. If half of entrepreneurs adopt inside money instead of outside money, all of them will choose the former regardless of authorities' decisions. The distinction between 'circulations' is crucial to explain the equilibrium that corresponds to Tooke's description : outside money is chosen for income circulation transactions whereas inside money (assumed to be less costly) is chosen in capital circulation.

Communications

Breton R., Rojas Breu M., Bignon V. (2013), Monetary Union, Banks and Financial Integration, 62nd annual meeting of the AFSE, Marseille, France

This paper analyzes a two-country model of money and banks to examine the conditions under which the creation of a monetary union between two countries is optimal. Is is shown that if agents resort to banks to adjust their monetary holdings through borrowing and if nobody can force them to repay their debts, it may be optimal for both countries to set up two different currencies, along with strictly positive conversion costs. A necessary condition for this is that credit market integration is limited. This arises even though both countries are perfectly identical.

Rojas Breu M. (2011), Debt enforcement and the return on money, Séminaire de finance du CEREG, Paris, France

L' utilisation comme moyen de paiement d' actifs à rendement faible, comme la monnaie fi du- ciaire, alors qu' il existe des actifs à rendement plus élevé sans risque demeure une énigme en théorie monétaire. Dès lors qu 'une réponse satisfaisante à cette question n a pas été formulée, les conclusions tirées des modèles monétaires qui supposent, de manière arbitraire, une limite à la liquidité des actifs alternatifs pour assurer un prix positif de la monnaie à l 'équilibre s 'avèrent difficiles à évaluer. Cet article présente un cadre dans lequel la monnaie a un prix positif à l 'équilibre malgré l 'existence d 'un actif à rendement plus élevé et l 'absence de contraintes lé- gales et de coûts de transaction associés à l' utilisation de cet actif. L 'argument proposé est que l' utilisation de la monnaie est associée avec des frictions sous-jacentes aux contrats de dette. Dans une économie dans laquelle les débiteurs peuvent échapper à leurs obligations contractuelles - la capacité des agents à s 'engager à rembourser des dettes est limitée -, le rendement effectif des actifs est déterminé par les incitations au remboursement volontaire des dettes. Il est montré que l 'infl ation ou, plus généralement, le taux de dépréciation d un ac- tif dans lequel les dettes sont libellées peut opérer comme un dispositif d 'engagement. Par conséquent, la monnaie est utilisée à l' équilibre et le taux optimal d' infl ation est positif.

The rate-of-return-dominance puzzle asks why low-return assets, like fiat money, are used in actual economies given that risk-free higher-return assets are available. As long as this question remains unresolved, most conclusions from monetary models which arbitrarily restrict the marketability properties of alternative assets to make money valuable are difficult to assess. In this paper, I provide a framework in which Öat money has value in equilibrium, even though a higher-return asset is available and there are neither restrictions nor transaction costs in using it. I suggest that the use of money is associated with frictions underlying debt contracts. In an environment where full enforcement is not feasible, the actual rate of return on assets is determined by incentives eliciting voluntary debt repayment. I show that the inflation rate or, more generally, the depreciation rate of an asset in which debts are denominated may function as a commitment device. As a result, money is used in equilibrium and the optimal inflation rate is positive.

Documents de travail

Bignon V., Breton R., Rojas Breu M. (2013), Currency Union with and without Banking Union, Documents de travail de la Banque de France, Paris, Banque de France, 44

Cet article propose un modèle avec monnaie externe, banques et défaut endogène sur les emprunts afin d'analyser l'impact du degré d'imperfection du marché du crédit sur la désirabilité -pour les populations- des unions monétaires. Nous montrons que lorsque ces imperfections entraînent un coût plus élevé pour les banques d'octroyer un crédit sur l'étranger plutôt que dans leur juridiction, le bien-être peut être réduit en régime d'union monétaire. Nous montrons également que la mise en place d'une union bancaire qui supprimerait ces barrières à l'intégration des marchés du crédit restaure le résultat habituel d'optimalité des unions. Les implications empiriques de ces résultats pour l'organisation de l'union bancaire sont discutées.

This paper analyzes a two-country model of currency, banks and endogenous default to study whether impediments to credit market integration across jurisdictions impact the desirability of a currency union. We show that when those impediments induce a higher cost for banks to manage cross-border credit compared to domestic credit, welfare may not be maximal under a regime of currency union. But a banking union that would suppress hurdles to banking integration restores the optimality of that currency arrangement. The empirical and policy implications in terms of banking union are discussed.

Rojas Breu M. (2010), Inflation, debt enforcement and currency competition,, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 30

International, low-inflation, currencies are increasingly available everywhere. However, domestic currencies remain the means of payment mostly used in the vast majority of countries. This observation conáicts with the literature on currency competition which predicts that, in absence of transaction costs, agents will prefer to use the less ináationary currency. In this paper, I provide a framework in which ináationary currencies are used, despite the availability of a less ináationary currency. I suggest that the use of domestic currencies is associated with the legal environment that determines the degree of debt enforcement. My key assumption is that full enforcement is not feasible. This entails that the rate of return on currencies is in part determined by incentives eliciting voluntary debt repayment. I show that, under certain conditions, the inflation rate of a currency in which debts are denominated may function as a commitment device. As a result, the more ináationary currency is preferred in equilibrium, despite the absence of costs in using the less ináationary currency.

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