Curriculum vitae

Keppler Jan-Horst

Professeur des universités
LEDa

Jan-Horst.KEPPLERping@dauphinepong.fr
Tel : 01 44 05 45 13
Bureau : P 139

Biographie

JAN HORST KEPPLER

Born:     Hamburg, 26 December 1961

Nationality:     German                 

Civil Status:      Married, one child

Tel.:    01 42 30 84 80

Port.:  06 77 81 37 46

Email: jan-horst.keppler@dauphine.fr

 

EDUCATION and QUALIFICATIONS

      UNIVERSITÉ PAUL VALÉRY – MONTPELLIER (2002)

  • Professor of economics after national examination (“agrégation”)

      UNIVERSITY OF VERSAILLES-SAINT-QUENTIN-EN-YVELINES (2000)

  • Habilitation in economics

      THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD (1987-1990)

  • M.A. and Ph.D. in economics

      Thesis: Monopolistic Competition Theory 1926-1941 (Director, Peter Newman)

      BOLOGNA CENTRE of the JHU School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), (1986-1987)

  • Diploma in international relations and economics

      UNIVERSITA DI BOLOGNA, DAMS (1984-85)

  • Studies in semiotics (U. Eco), mass communication and urbanism

      FREE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN, Department of Comparative Literature (1982-84, 1985-86)

  • M.A. in comparative literature and history

      Thesis: Diderot’s Jacques le Fataliste and Sterne’s Tristram Shandy as open works of art

 

CURRENT POSITION

UNIVERSITÉ PARIS-DAUPHINE (since 9/2004)

Full Professor of Economics

Director of Chair European Electricity Markets (CEEM) with work on electricity market design for investment in low carbon electricity markets, flexibility management and infrastructure investment

Director of the Masters programme « Energy, Finance, Carbon » (Master 129)

OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (since 2/2009)

Senior Economic Advisor in the Nuclear Development Division, research and project management in economics of nuclear power in low carbon electricity systems, carbon pricing, system effects, coordination with IEA on joint projects, COP21 coordination.

Other key responsibilities

  • Senior Researcher at CGEMP on electricity markets, carbon markets and energy economics
  • Senior Researcher at PHARE, Université Paris I Pantheon Sorbonne on theories of competition
  • Coordinator of undergraduate teaching in Industrial Economics
  • Teachings Environmental Economics, Energy and Industrial Economics and History of Thought
  • Member of the Exchange Council of EPEX Spot, the European power exchange
  • Technical work for Low Carbon 100 (low carbon stock market index by NYSE Euronext)
  • Director « European Governance and Geopolitics of Energy », Ifri, (2006-2008).

 

FORMER POSITIONS

UNIVERSITÉ PAUL VALÉRY – MONTPELLIER III (2002-2004)

Professor of economics

  • Teaching Industrial economics, History of economic thought and Natural resource economics
  • Senior Researcher, GRESE, University Paris I – Pantheon Sorbonne

 

UNIVERSITÉ DE VERSAILLES SAINT-QUENTIN-EN-YVELINES (2001-2002)

Full-time Associate Professor in economics

  • Teaching in Industrial Economics, Energy and Natural Resource Economics
  • Researcher at the C3ED, delegate to the European CATEP programme on emissions trading

 

OECD and INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (IEA), PARIS (1994-2001)

Principal economist

  • IEA Economic Analysis Division and Energy and Environment Division
  • OECD Environment Directorate, Economics Division
  • Research in energy economics, energy subsidies and market reform, energy efficiency, emissions trading, biodiversity, energy and environment, sustainable development
  • Numerous publications, secretary for two OECD bodies, oversight of consultants

 

ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT STIFTUNG, Bonn and Washington, D.C. (1991-1994)

Director of North American Office

  • Creation of American subsidiary of worldwide organisation for scientific exchange
  • Implementation of high-level projects for international scientific collaboration

 

PROGNOS (European Centre of Applied Economics), Basel (CH), (1990-1991)

Economist

  • Development of conceptual framework for major study on energy externalities funded by German Ministry of Economics (BMWi)
  • Responsibility for the coordination of sub-contractors

 

 

FELLOWSHIPS

Fellowship of the JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY                                                              1988-90

Fellowship of the JHU BOLOGNA-SAIS CENTRE                                                               1987-88

Fellowship of the DEUTSCHE AKADEMISCHE AUSTAUSCHDIENST                                              1984-85

 

 

LANGUAGE SKILLS

German:                                           Native

English, French and Italian:          Fluent

Spanish:                                            Reading knowledge

Publications

Articles

Keppler J-H. (2017), Rationales for Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms: Security of Supply Externalities and Asymmetric Investment Incentives, Energy Policy, 105, p. 562-570

Economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in deregulated electricity markets. Ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets, CRMs are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner, lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination. They are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical benchmark model that argues that competitive energy-only markets with VOLL pricing provide adequate levels of capacity. While the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity market design, it ignores the two market failures that make CRMs the practically appropriate and theoretically justified policy response to capacity issues. First, energy-only markets fail to internalize security-of-supply externalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private non-consumption of electricity. Second, when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are discretely sized, investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest. After presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model, this paper conceptualizes security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding design of CRMs.

Keppler J-H., Le Pen Y., Phan S. (2016), The impacts of variable renewable production and market coupling on the convergence of French and German electricity prices, The Energy Journal, 37, 3, p. 343-359

As speculative flows into commodity futures are expected to link commodity prices more strongly to equity indices, we investigate whether this process also creates increased correlations amongst the commodities themselves. Considering U.S. oil and gas futures, we investigate whether common factors, derived from a large international data set of real and nominal macroeconomic variables by means of the large approximate factor models methodology, are able to explain both returns and whether, beyond these fundamental common factors, the residuals remain correlated. We further investigate a possible explanation for this residual correlation by using some proxies for trading intensity derived from CFTC publicly available data, showing most notably that the proxy for speculation in the oil market increases the oil-gas correlation. We thus identify the central role of financial activities in shaping the link between oil and gas returns.

Keppler J-H. (2016), Review of the New English Translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg (1934, 2011) Market Structure and Equilibrium, Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology, 34, p. 405-411

This English translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg's Marktform und Gleichgewicht will be welcomed by economists working in the field of industrial organisation and beyond. It has been overdue for more than 80 years. This translation will allow matters to be set straight concerning a number of fundamental theoretical issues connected to Stackelberg's work as well as allow to clarify a number of misunderstandings that go back to the first reviews of Stackelberg's 1934 classic on competition theory.

Cometto M., Keppler J-H. (2013), The interaction between nuclear and renewable sources of energy and its systemic effects in low-carbon electricity grids, Responsabilité et environnement, 1, 69, p. 29-35

Nous présentons dans cet article une synthèse des résultats de l'étude « Énergies nucléaire et renouvelables : effets systémiques dans les réseaux électriques bas carbone » récemment publiée par l'Agence pour l'Énergie Nucléaire de l'OCDE. Cette étude analyse les interactions entre les technologies programmables et les énergies renouvelables variables (principalement l'éolien et le solaire), présente les principaux effets de ces interactions sur le système électrique et apporte des estimations empiriques systématiques des coûts associés pour six pays membres de l'OCDE.

This presentation of the findings of Nuclear energy and renewables : System effects in low-carbon electricity systems (recently published by OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency) analyzes the interactions between "variable renewables and dispatchable energy technologies" (mainly wind and solar power). It describes the major effects of these interactions on the electricity grid and systematically estimates the associated costs for six OECD countries.

Keppler J-H., Finon D., Geoffron P. (2013), Sept propositions pour une Europe électrique efficace et dynamique, Revue de l'Energie, 612, p. 95-105

Si la libéralisation des industries électriques appelle la très longue durée, tant est complexe cette industrie, les Européens attendent, au bout de quinze années, des bénéfices identifiables en matière de prix, d'innovation dans les services associés, de performance environnementale ou de sécurité de fourniture... Plutôt que l'évidence du progrès, la complexité - voire la confusion - caractérise aujourd'hui l'Europe électrique. L'insertion de renouvelables intermittentes à grande échelle amplifie la difficulté de progression vers un régime de marchés électriques simple et efficace. La vocation de la nouvelle Chaire European Electricity Markets qui vient d'être installée à Paris Dauphine est de rentrer dans cette complexité pour explorer les solutions de second et de troisième rang qui permettraient d'améliorer la situation. La voie est étroite, mais il nous paraît possible, dans l'espace électrique européen, d'associer coordination publique, régime de marché et équité sociale. On le fait ici autour de sept recommandations, dont certaines concernent directement les enjeux de la transition énergétique.

Keppler J-H. (2012), The economic costs of the nuclear phase-out in Germany, NEA News, 30, 1, p. 8-14

In the immediate aftermath of the March 2011 TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the German federal government decided to temporarily halt the operation of the country's eight oldest energy-producing nuclear reactors. This was accompanied by a cabinet proposal to phase out all 17 of the country's nuclear reactors, which have a combined capacity of 20.5 GW, by 2022. On 31 July 2011 the proposal became law, and the temporary shutdown of the eight reactors was converted into a permanent shutdown by 6 August 2011. Shutting down reactors with an average lifetime of 33.5 years (compared to an industry standard of at least 40 years and in some countries, such as the United States, of 60 years) imposes significant costs on German power producers, electricity consumers and the German economy. This article estimates the direct costs linked to the shutdown of Germany's nuclear power reactors before the end of their operational lifetimes. These are costs that are immediately passed on in the form of higher costs for electricity producers or higher prices for electricity consumers. The direct costs of the shutdown take on three forms: a) the costs for constructing and operating replacement capacity on the supply side, b) higher electricity prices and a concomitant loss of consumer surplus on the demand side, and c) increased electricity imports. The costs for replacement capacity can be subdivided into additional investments costs, higher operating costs and higher costs for transport and distribution to the extent that replacement capacity is composed of decentralised renewables located far from final consumers. Higher electricity prices are due in the short term to a reduction of capacity margins (which means that equipment with higher operating costs will need to be employed), and in the long run due to an increase in the prices of gas, coal and carbon due to additional demand. A crucial element in determining the cost of the decision of the German government to phase out nuclear power is the baseline against which the costs of the electricity system resulting from the phase-out decision need to be assessed. This exercise takes the situation immediately preceding the phase-out decision in March 2011 as its baseline.

Cruciani M., Keppler J-H. (2010), Rents in the European Power Sector due to Carbon Trading, Energy Policy, 38, 8, p. 4280-4290

The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the allowances for CO2 emissions of electricity companies. Integrating this allowance price into the price of electricity earns a rent for companies who have received these allowances for free. During Phase I, 2005-2007, rents corresponding to the aggregate value of allocated allowances amounted to roughly EUR 13 billion per year. However, due to the specific price-setting mechanism in electricity markets true rents were considerably higher. This is due to the fact that companies also that have not received any allowances gain additional infra-marginal rents to the extent that their variable costs are below the new market price after inclusion of the allowance price. Producers with low carbon emissions and low marginal costs thus also benefit substantially from carbon pricing. This paper develops a methodology to determine the specific interaction of the imposition of such a CO2 constraint and the price-setting mechanism in the electricity sector under the assumption of marginal cost pricing in a liberalized European electricity market. The article thus provides an empirical estimate of the true total rents of power producers during Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005-2007). The EU ETS generated in Phase I additional rents in excess of EUR 19 billion per year for electricity producers. These transfers are distributed very unevenly between different electricity producers. In a second step, the paper assesses the impact of switching from free allocation to an auctioning of allowances in 2013. We show that such a switch to auctioning will continue to create additional infra-marginal rents for certain producers and will leave the electricity sector as a whole better off than before the introduction of the EU ETS.

Keppler J-H., Mansanet-Bataller M. (2010), Causalities between CO2, electricity, and other energy variables during phase I and phase II of the EU ETS, Energy Policy, 38, 7, p. 3329-3341

The topic of this article is the analysis of the interplay between daily carbon, electricity and gas price data with the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) for CO2 emissions. In a first step we have performed Granger causality tests for Phase I of the EU ETS (January 2005 until December 2007) and the first year of Phase II of the EU ETS (2008). The analysis includes both spot and forward markets--given the close interactions between the two sets of markets. The results show that during Phase I coal and gas prices, through the clean dark and spark spread, impacted CO2 futures prices, which in return Granger caused electricity prices. During the first year of the Phase II, the short-run rent capture theory (in which electricity prices Granger cause CO2 prices) prevailed. On the basis of the qualitative results of the Granger causality tests we obtained the formulation testable equations for quantitative analysis. Standard OLS regressions yielded statistically robust and theoretically coherent results.

Keppler J-H. (2010), L'énergie nucléaire est-elle vraiment compétitive ?, AEN infos, 28.1, p. 4-8

Keppler J-H. (2009), Barriers to Entryn : Abolishing the Barriers to Understanding, Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche, 27, 2-3, p. 90-124

The concept of a barrier to entry has been discussed least since Bain [1956] with important contributions by Spence [1977], Dixit [1980] and Milgrom-Roberts [1982]. The more recent discussion is synthesized in the contributions to a dedicated session at the 2004 AEA meeting. Yet, a 'barrier to entry' remains a surprisingly elusive concept, which even accomplished theorists fail to define in an unequivocal manner. This article shows that past and current contributions to the subject fail to resolve the issue, because they insist on analyzing barriers to entry in the context of identical firms in homogenous goods industries. This inevitably leads to logical inconsistencies as each theorist provides his own ad hoc definition of a barrier to avoid Bertrand competition. We show that the notion of a barrier to entry has economic pertinence only if interpreted as a fully sunk cost in the form of a unique, indivisible, non tradable factor of production. This, however, implies monopolistic competition with welfare implications of a barrier to entry being positive as well as negative. Regulators thus need to ensure the ability of all competitors to create their own welfare-enhancing 'barriers to entry' in a dynamic context rather than to focus on their existence in purely negative and static terms.

Cruciani M., Keppler J-H. (2009), Les rentes dues au marché du CO2 dans le secteur européen de l'électricité, Economies et Sociétés. Série EN, Economie de l'énergie, 43, 10, p. 1623-1627

With the introduction of CO2 allowances, the European Union Carbon Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has imposed a price on the CO2 emissions of power generating companies. In line with economic theory, these companies pass on the costs of allowances and integrate it into the price of electricity. Due to the specific remuneration of electricity supplied at different periods due to fluctuating demand this affects the infra-marginal rents gained by different technologies. This paper provides a methodology for determining the specific interaction of the imposition of such a CO2 constraint on the price-setting mechanism in the power generation sector, given the context of marginal cost pricing in a liberalized European electricity market. As nearly 100 % of these allowances are allocated for free between 2005 and 2012, previous marginal and inframarginal rents have been profoundly modified since 2005. Building on the proposed methodology, the article provides an empirical estimation of the rents of power producers during Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005 - 2007) according to the different technologies. Finally, the paper assesses the impact on rents of the upcoming switch from free allocation of allowances to auctioning by 2013.

Keppler J-H. (2008), Le triangle des prix carbone-gaz-électricité sur le marché au comptant, Tendances carbone, 29, p. 4

Keppler J-H. (2008), Carbone, entre profits et taxe, Environnement et Stratégie, 265, p. 7

Les mécanismes du marché ne pourront résoudre qu'une part du défi climatique : la taxe carbone s'avère nécessaire pour impliquer tous les émetteurs, petits et grands. Comment voyez-vous le marché global du carbone évoluer dans les années à venir ? Il va certainement bien se développer, les questions se posent pour l'après-2012. L'incertitude globale sur le processus de Kyoto pèse sur l'ensemble : l'attitude des États-Unis.

Keppler J-H. (2007), L'Union européenne et sa politique énergétique, Politique étrangère, 3, p. 529-543

L'énergie a été une question centrale pour la construction européenne, dès son origine. L'évolution internationale actuelle oblige l'Union à redéfinir sa politique énergétique autour de logiques différentes : il s'agit d'accepter l'interdépendance globale, et la création de structures favorisant le développement, la réactivité, et la compétitivité des industries européennes de l'énergie, avec une approche ouverte fondée sur les marchés. Ainsi l'énergie se retrouvera-t-elle au coeur de la dynamique européenne.

Energy has always been a central issue for the European construction. The current international development forces the Union to redefine its energy policy according to another logic : accept global interdependence and the creation of structures favoring the development, the reactivity, and the competitiveness of the European energy industry, with an open approach based on markets. Energy will thus be again at the heart of the European dynamics.

Keppler J-H. (2007), Security of Energy Supply : A European Perspective, European Review of Energy Markets, 2, 2, p. 5-37

Keppler J-H. (2007), Energy Interdependence in a Multi-polar World : Towards a Market-based Strategy for Safeguarding European Energy Supplies, Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, 46, 4, p. 31-48

Europe is a large energy importing region and destined to remain so for the foreseeable future. Ensuring the security of its energy supplies is principally hampered by two issues : first, the lack of a sustainable policy trade-off between the competing objectives of security of energy supply, competitiveness and environmental protection ; second, a clear understanding that security of supply for an energy importing region demands first and foremost the multilateral strengthening of the global energy trading system. The article will provide in its first part an overview of the European energy situation and will outline in its second part promising directions for policy-action at the European level.

Keppler J-H. (2007), Piero Sraffa and Attilio Da Empoli : competing solutions for the crisis of the theory of the firm in the early 20th century, Il pensiero economico italiano, 15, 2, p. 51-67

Keppler J-H. (2007), Mai 2007 - Echec du bilatéralisme dans les négociations énergétiques, BIP. Bulletin de l'Industrie Pétrolière, 10864, p. 6-7

Keppler J-H. (2006), L'Europe doit bâtir une politique énergétique réaliste, Energies news, 116, p. 10-11

Keppler J-H. (2006), Une logique économique qui cherche à s'affirmer, BIP. Bulletin de l'Industrie Pétrolière, 10508, p. 6-8

Keppler J-H., Lallement J. (2006), The Origins of the U-Shaped Average Cost Curve: Understanding the Complexities of the Modern Theory of the Firm, History of Political Economy, 38, 4, p. 733-774

The article discusses the origins of the U-shaped average cost curve, which is one of the most widely used tools in microeconomic analysis. Its widespread use leads many to consider it as a basic tool, obscuring the fact that the graph of the U-shaped average cost curve is part of a complex theoretical construct that didn't emerge until the 20th century. The curve's complexity stems from a careful balance between increasing returns and perfect competition, short-run and long-run considerations of production, and logical consistency, a balance that was first stated by the successors of Alfred Marshall, who are detailed in the article.

Keppler J-H. (2005), L'avenir de l'énergie nucléaire en Europe : une leçon pour la gestion du risque en provenance de Finlande, Revue de l'Energie, 567, p. 305-310

Keppler J-H., Méritet S. (2004), Les perspectives énergétiques de la Chine, Revue de l'Energie, 557, p. 316-320

Keppler J-H. (2004), The search for a theory of competition with empirical relevance: lessons from the monopolistic competition revolution, Revue économique, 55, 3, p. 557-567

Les raisons de l'émergence des théories de la concurrence monopolistique sont bien connues. Celles de leur déclin le sont moins. Cet article identifie les forces principales qui font que les théories de la concurrence monopolistique restent une parenthèse dans l'histoire de la pensée économique. Il se concentre sur l'aspect épistémologique du problème. Il était largement reconnu que ces théories possédaient un degré accru de « réalisme ». L'histoire des théories de la concurrence monopolistique met en évidence le caractère problématique d'une telle vertu et la tension qu'elle maintient inévitablement avec les fondements mêmes de la discipline économique.

The reasons for the rise of the theories of monopolistic competition are fairly well identified. This is much less the case for their decline. This article will identify the forces that are responsible for the fact that the theories of monopolistic competition remain an interlude in the history of economic thought. It will concentrate on the epistemological aspect of the issue. It is largely recognised that these theories possessed a greater degree of "realism". The history of the theories of monopolistic competition renders evident the problematic character of this quality and the inevitable tension that it creates with the very foundations of economic theory.

Keppler J-H. (2001), Attilio da Empoli's contribution to monopolistic competition theory, Journal of Economic Studies, 28, 4/5, p. 305 - 323

Considers the contribution of Attilio da Empoli to the theory of value and distribution and especially his contribution to the theory of monopolistic competition. During the 1920s a lively discussion developed about the link between the cost structure of the individual firm and the degree of competition in the wake of the demise of the Marshallian concept of the "representative firm". In this context, Attilio da Empoli contributed two monographs with the declared intent to provide a new theory of value. While falling short of this ambitious objective, shows that Attilio da Empoli formulated a number of original insights that were fully developed only many years later. The two most important of these concern the contestability of markets ("external competition") and the inadequacy of the Cournot solution for spatially differentiated firms that compete with otherwise identical products.

Keppler J-H., Birol F. (2000), Prices, technology development and the rebound effect, Energy Policy, 28, 6–7, p. 457–469

Energy efficiency is the critical parameter for policies that aim at reducing energy consumption while maintaining or even boosting economic growth. The two main options to influence energy efficiency are changes in relative prices, i.e., raising the price of energy through economic instruments, or to introduce new technologies which increase the productivity of each unit of energy. This paper is based on the notion that in an equilibrium economy the marginal economic productivity is identical for all factors, i.e., energy, labour, knowledge and capital. From this premise two main conclusions can be drawn. First, any change in price or technology will have an impact on the whole economy by creating feedbacks through the substitution of factors of production and goods, as well as increased wealth. Second, the two policy approaches, changing relative prices and technology development, are not opposite to each other. They are the two faces of the same reality and should be developed and promoted simultaneously and consistently.

Mountford H., Keppler J-H. (1999), Financing incentives for the protection of biodiversity, Science of The Total Environment, 240, p. 133-144

The conservation or sustainable use of biological diversity presents special challenges for policy-makers because of its complex nature and the difficulties associated with identifying the underlying causes that lead to biodiversity loss. As such, it is often necessary that a range of incentive measures are utilised to ensure both the private and the public benefits of its conservation or sustainable use are realised. Incentive measures available for this purpose include economic incentives (such as taxes, charges, tradable use rights, and subsidies), regulatory measures (such as development or access restrictions), and the provision of relevant information and sufficient institutional capacity. While many of the direct use values of biodiversity are privately appropriable given a clear assignment of property rights and the existence of markets, other financing methods are often necessary for the realisation of other values, such as indirect use values, non-use values and option values. This paper expands the analysis in the Handbook of Incentive Measures for Biodiversity: Design and Implementation (OECD, 1999) developed under the responsibility of the OECD Expert Group on Economic Aspects of Biodiversity to discuss some of the methods available for financing incentive measures for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Where appropriate, case studies of experiences in OECD countries are drawn upon to provide practical examples of the financing and implementation of incentive measures.

Keppler J-H. (1998), Externalities, fixed costs and information, Kyklos, 51, 4, p. 547-563

Keppler J-H. (1998), The Genesis of 'Positive Economics' and the Rejection of Monopolistic Competition Theory: A Methodological Debate, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, 3, p. 261-276

In 'The Methodology of Positive Economics' (1953), Milton Friedman linked the adoption of a falsificationist methodology to the rejection of monopolistic competition as a valid assumption, thus elaborating a point made earlier by George Stigler in 'Monopolistic Competition in Retrospect' (1949). Both failed to demonstrate that the alternative assumption of perfect competition would perform better under falsificationist rules. These rules themselves are an expression of the ambition to establish an economic science rather than a convincing framework for research. Monopolistic competition theory became the main target of attack, as it highlighted the problematic nature of empirical research interested in perfectly generalizable results.

Keppler J-H. (1998), Economists and Language, History of Economic Ideas, VI, 3, p. 35-50

Keppler J-H. (1994), Luigi Amoroso (1886-1965): Mathematical Economist, Italian Corporatist, History of Political Economy, 26, 4, p. 589-611

Ouvrages

Keppler J-H., Chase R. (2010), Adam Smith and the Economy of the Passions, New-York, Routledge, 164 p.

The fertility of Adam Smith's work stems from a paradoxical structure where the pursuit of economic self-interest and wealth accumulation serve wider social objectives. The incentive for this wealth accumulation comes from a desire for social recognition or "sympathy" - the need to recognise ourselves in our peers - which is the primary incentive for moderating and transforming our violent and egotistical passions. Adam Smith thus examines in detail the subliminal emotional structure underlying market behaviour. This new book by Professor Jan Horst Keppler presents an Adam Smith for the 21st century, more sceptical, searching and daring than he has ever been portrayed before. Without disputing the benefits of Adam Smith's liberal economic system, Professor Keppler's original contribution explores the anarchic passions constantly threatening to destroy all social bounds, and how the overarching "desire for love" and social recognition provides the Smithian individual with the incentive to transform his unsocial passions into a desire for social advancement and economic wealth with the view to gaining the vital approbation of his peers. One of the most striking results of this new reading of Adam Smith is the latter's insistence on the primacy of exchange value over use value. In other words, the quest for wealth is exclusively driven by the value it represents in the eyes of others rather than by any value in individual use. At a moment of crisis, where the link between "true" economic values and "virtual" financial values is more fragile than ever, Adam Smith's work is a profoundly contemporary reminder that in the absence of personal, ethical groundings our economic actions are only grounded in the game of mirrors we play with our peers. This book will be of interest to postgraduate students and researchers in the History of Economics, or indeed any reader with an interest in the psychological foundations of a market economy and its theoretical representations as developed by Adam Smith.

Keppler J-H., Kérébel C. (2009), La gouvernance mondiale de l'énergie, Paris, IFRI, 256 p.

Sécurité des approvisionnements, compétitivité économique, performance environnementale - l'énergie se situe au coeur même des grandes questions politiques en Europe et ailleurs. Il est donc légitime et utile de se demander selon quelles règles s'organisent sa production et sa consommation. Mais l'intérêt renouvelé pour la gouvernance de ce secteur résulte également d'un sentiment diffus d'insatisfaction envers son état actuel. Décisions ad hoc, absence de règles, mélange abrupt d'enjeux économiques et politiques... Nul doute que producteurs et consommateurs d'énergie tireraient profit d'une plus grande clarté des règles d'engagement. Cette monographie comprend cinq chapitres : - Qu'est-ce-que la gouvernance de l'énergie ? Les termes du débat - Quelle gouvernance globale pour les marchés du pétrole et du gaz ? - Investir dans le secteur de l'énergie : une question de gouvernance - Outils et acteurs de la gouvernance carbone - L'organisation mondiale du commerce peut-elle être un modèle de gouvernance pour le secteur de l'énergie ?

Chevalier J-M., Frison-Roche M-A., Keppler J-H. (2008), Economie et droit de la régulation des infrastructures : perspectives des pays en voie de développement, Paris, LGDJ, 274 p.

Après avoir relevé les divers défis affectant la régulation des industries de réseau et discuté de la pertinence des modèles disséminés par les institutions financières des pays en voie de développement, l'ouvrage met en lumière les inquiétudes des acteurs de l'industrie et les limitations des politiques régulatrices. La nécessité d'un capital institutionnel et humain est ensuite évoquée.

Keppler J-H. (2008), L'économie des passions selon Adam Smith : les noms du père d'Adam, Paris, Kimé, 170 p.

Pour A. Smith, le libéralisme économique est la seule forme d'organisation sociale capable de garantir l'équilibre fragile des passions humaines. Incorporant des considérations linguistiques, philosophiques et psychanalytiques à l'approche économique, cette étude révèle l'oeuvre d'A. Smith comme étant structurée entre une éthique ouverte et une morale socialement codifiée.

Keppler J-H., Lesourne J. (2007), Abatement of CO2 emissions in the European Union, Paris, IFRI, 156 p.

Girod J., Bourbonnais R., Keppler J-H. (2007), The Econometrics of Energy Systems, Basingstoke (UK), New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 266 p.

Twenty years of liberalization have transformed the energy sector. The old energy world of long-term contracts and personal contacts has changed beyond recognition into a set of highly competitive markets with instantaneous decision-making much like the financial sector. Decentralized decision-making by multiple actors creates the necessary environment for applying econometric techniques. More importantly, the complexity and volatility of these new markets create strong demand for quantitative analysis and, in particular, econometric techniques. Written jointly by energy economists and econometricians, this book offers an introduction to the state of the art in econometric modelling applied to the most pertinent issues in today's energy markets.

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Keppler J-H. (2010), Sécurité d'approvisionnement énergétique et contribution de l'énergie nucléaire - concepts et problématique, in Liversain L., Lokhov A., Keppler J. (eds), The Security of Energy Supply and the Contribution of Nuclear Energy, Paris, Nuclear Development, OECD Publishing, p. 19-63

Keppler J-H. (2010), Going with Coase beyond Coase : the dynamic approach to the internalization of external effects, in Fessler D., Lautier D., Lasry J-M. (eds), The economics of sustainable development, Paris, Economica, p. 118-138

The article develops R.H.Coase's insight that the level of transaction costs in the market determines the amount of externalities, thus providing arguments against government intervention. Contrary to Coase, however, we argue that the level of transaction costs cannot be considered as given, and that there is therefore a case for selective and innovative government intervention to reduce such transaction costs(...)

Keppler J-H. (2009), Climate Change, Security of Supply and Competitiveness: Does Europe Have the Means to Implement its Ambitious Energy Vision?, in Chevalier J-M. (eds), The new energy crisis : Climate, Economics and Geopolitics, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 202-230

Keppler J-H., Schülke C. (2009), Investir dans le secteur de l'énergie : une question de gouvernance, in Keppler J., Kérébel C. (dir.), La gouvernance mondiale de l'énergie, Paris, IFRI, p. 43

Keppler J-H. (2008), Building a common european energy policy around a market based approach, in Lesourne J. (eds), The external energy policy of the European Union, Paris, IFRI, p. 15-42

Keppler J-H. (2008), Dépasser des oppositions dogmatiques désuètes pour créer un véritable marché unique sur la base de solutions concrètes intelligentes,, La France face aux défis énergétiques : quels choix stratégiques ?, Paris, Altedia M&M Conseil, p. 56-59

Keppler J-H. (2008), Dealing with environmental externalities : the economic approach, in Fessler D., Lasry J-M. (eds), Finance and sustainable development : opposition or partnership ? Proceedings of the 2007 overview symposium, Paris, Economica, p. 155-183

Keppler J-H. (2008), Saving the whole by saving the parts : nature, biodiversity and the market, in Lasry J-M., Fessler D. (eds), Finance and sustainable development : opposition or partnership ? Proceedings of the 2007 overview symposium, Paris, Economica, p. 82-186

Keppler J-H. (2008), Marché, administration, régulation : théorie économique et régulation des industries de réseau, in Chevalier J-M., Frison-Roche M-A., Keppler J. (dir.), Économie et droit de la régulation des infrastructures?. Perspectives des pays en voie de développement, Paris, LGDJ, p. 53-72

Keppler J-H. (2007), Pétrole. La nécessité d'une approche multilatérale, in Montbrial T., Moreau Defarges P. (dir.), RAMSES 2008 : rapport annuel mondial sur le système économique et les stratégies, Paris, DUNOD, p. 68-71

Keppler J-H. (2007), We Do not yet Have the Answers, but We Know the Right Questions : Lessons Learned from the 2005 - 2007 Trial Phase of the EU Emission Trading System, in Keppler J., Lesourne J. (eds), Abatement of CO2 emissions in the European Union, Paris, IFRI, p. 137-156

Keppler J-H. (2007), Causality and Cointegration between Energy Consumption and Economic Growth in Developing Countries, in Keppler J., Bourbonnais R., Girod J. (eds), The econometrics of energy systems, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 75-97

Keppler J-H. (2002), Marktform un Gleichgewicht, in De Vroey M., Lallement J., Greffe X. (dir.), Dictionnaire des grandes oeuvres économiques, Paris, Dalloz, p. 553-560

Varangu K., Pershing J., Keppler J-H. (2001), Energy,, Développement durable : les grandes questions, Paris, OCDE, p. 377-408

Keppler J-H. (2001), Key Features and principles,, Développement durable : les grandes questions, Paris, OCDE, p. 35-52

Guillaud Y., Swanson T., Keppler J-H. (1999), Aspects économiques du partage des avantages, in Organisation de coopération et de développement economiques D. (dir.), Aspects économiques du partage des avantages : concepts et experiences pratiques, Paris, OCDE, p. 6-38

Keppler J-H. (1996), Public goods, infrastructure, externalities and subsidies: a conceptual framework for the "IEA questionnaire on government interventions in the energy sector",, Subsidies and environment: exploring the linkages, Paris, OECD Publishing, p. 193-200

Communications

Keppler J-H., Cometto M. (2013), Short-term and Long-Term System Effects of Intermittent Renewables on Nuclear Energy and the Electricity Mix, "Les effets de système des énergies renouvelables intermittentes : mesure et internalisation". Séminaire de la Chaire European Electricity Markets, Université Paris Dauphine, Paris, France

Keppler J-H. (2007), Smith - Debreu : social Interaction and Mathematical Metaphors. Origin and conclusion of the Principal Scientific Research Project in Economic Theory, General Equilibrium as Knowledge, Paris, France

This paper provides evidence for the assertion that there is deep structural coherence between the work of Adam Smith and modern general equilibrium theory, most notably Gérard Debreu's Theory of Value. In particular, we show that Adam Smith formulated a number of highly original and to some extent quite stringent assumptions about the structure of human interaction that ultimately allow the establishment of a generalized market economy with a maximization of private as well as social benefits. The discussion focuses on the following issues: (a) methodology, (b) commodities, compactness and codification, (c) constant returns to scale, (d) convexity in preferences and (e) the invisible hand and Kakutani's fixed point theorem.

Keppler J-H., Hervé-Mignucci M. (2007), Do Carbon Permits Constitute a Respectable Asset Class? Efficiency, Liquidity and Volatility in comparison with Other Financial Markets, 5th International Financial Research Forum, Paris, France

Keppler J-H. (1996), Policy Instruments for Environmental Improvement in a Changing Market: An Overview, "New electricity markets and the environment : a workshop on instruments for environmental improvement in the context of commercial, institutional and technological change". Second EC/OECD/IEA workshop on energy externalities, Brussels, Belgique

Documents de travail

Boureau C., Le Pen Y., Phan S., Keppler J-H. (2014), The Impact of Intermittent Renewable Production and Market Coupling on the Convergence of French and German Electricity Prices, CEEM Working Paper, Paris, Fondation Paris-Dauphine, 17

Interconnecting two adjacent areas of electricity production generates benefits in combined consumer surplus and welfare by allowing electricity to flow from the low cost area to the high cost area. It will lower prices in the high cost area, raise them in the low cost area and will thus have prices in the two areas converge. With unconstrained interconnection capacity, price convergence is, of course, complete and the two areas are merged into a single area. With constrained interconnection capacity, the challenge for transport system operators (TSOs) and market operators is using the available capacity in an optimal manner. This was the logic behind the "market coupling" mechanism installed by European power market operators in November 2009 in the Central Western Europe (CWE) electricity market, of which France and Germany constitute by far the two largest members. Market coupling aims at optimising welfare by ensuring that buyers and sellers exchange electricity at the best possible price taking into account the combined order books all power exchanges involved as well as the available transfer capacities between different bidding zones. By doing so, interconnection capacity is allocated to those who value it most.

Bourbonnais R., Keppler J-H. (2013), Estimation de l'élasticité prix de la demande électrique en France, CEEM Working Paper, Paris, Fondation Paris Dauphine, 5

Sur la demande de l'Union française d'électricité (UFE), Jan Horst Keppler, Professeur d'économie à l'Université Paris - Dauphine, et Régis Bourbonnais, Maître de conférences à l'Université Paris - Dauphine et spécialiste en économétrie, ont entrepris une série de tests statistiques pour déterminer l'élasticité prix de la demande électrique en France.

Keppler J-H., Méritet S., Notz K. (2009), Les relations franco-allemandes dans le secteur de l'énergie, Note de l'Ifri, Paris, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 66

Cette note poursuit deux thématiques convergentes. Dans une perspective d'actualité immédiate, elle étudie les possibilités pour le couple franco-allemand de façonner l'agenda "énergie et climat" de l'Union européenne (UE) pendant les six mois de la présidence française. Dans une perspective de plus long terme, elle présente les secteurs énergétiques en France et en Allemagne dans leurs nouveaux contours. Loin des caricatures convenues - la France, "c'est" le nucléaire ; l'Allemagne, "c'est" le charbon et l'éolien - émerge ainsi un paysage énergétique complexe où les différents groupes d'acteurs des deux pays ont souvent plus en commun avec leurs homologues d'outre-Rhin qu'avec leurs concitoyens.

Cruciani M., Kérébel C., Keppler J-H. (2008), Le paquet énergie et climat du 23 janvier 2008 : un tournant pour l'Europe de l'énergie, Note de l'Ifri : gouvernance européenne et géopolitique de l'énergie, Paris, IFRI, 29

Pour le secteur de l'énergie en Europe, les perspectives d'un changement structurel majeur se concrétisent. Le 10 janvier 2007, la Commission européenne avait proposé un premier paquet global de mesures prioritaires à mettre en place pour établir une « politique de l'énergie pour l'Europe » (appelé communément le « paquet intégré de politique du climat et de l'énergie »)1. Sans force légale, puisque constitué essentiellement de communications, rapports et autres feuilles de route, ce train de propositions visait avant tout à orienter les décisions du Sommet européen des 8 et 9 mars 2007. À la surprise générale, les chefs des États européens ont accepté les principales orientations du paquet et lui ont ainsi conféré la légitimité politique nécessaire pour constituer un cadre pour les initiatives législatives détaillées de la Commission dans les mois suivants.

Keppler J-H. (2007), La sécurité des approvisionnements énergétiques en Europe : principes et mesures, Note de l'Ifri, IFRI, 16

L'Europe connaît enfin un débat sur sa politique d'énergie et la sécurité de ses approvisionnements énergétiques. Après un trop long silence, média, politiques, industriels et experts se bousculent soudainement pour demander une politique énergétique européenne commune, digne de ce nom, qui puisse garantir une haute sécurité des approvisionnements énergétiques, une performance environnementale satisfaisante et des prix compétitifs de l'énergie. Ce débat est bienvenu et nécessaire. Il faut cependant constater que cet émoi soudain est le résultat de la rencontre d'événements, d'informations et de motivations les plus divers. Dans le court terme, cela peut nuire à la lisibilité du débat. Plus gravement, dans le long terme, ce mélange des genres peut nuire à la capacité à formuler des recommandations qui soient à la fois énergétiquement faisables, économiquement efficaces et politiquement soutenables.

Gruenspecht H., Lee R., Eyre N., Kram T., Keppler J-H. (1997), Full Cost Pricing. Annex I Expert Group on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Policies and Measures for Common Action, Paris, OCDE, 33

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