Curriculum vitae

Forges Françoise

Professeur des universités
Tel : 01 44 05 49 36
Bureau : P128



Forges F., Horst U., Salomon A. (2016), Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games, International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 45, n°1, p. 11-36

Forges F., Salomon A. (2015), Bayesian repeated games and reputation, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, p. 70-104

Eliaz K., Forges F. (2015), Information Disclosure to Cournot duopolists, Economics Letters, vol. 126, p. 167-170

Forges F., Minelli E. (2014), Corrigendum to “Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 151, p. 605-606

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2014), Afriat's theorem for indivisible goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 54, p. 1-6

Forges F. (2013), J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice", Revue française d'économie, vol. 27, n°3, p. 19-34

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2013), Essential Data, Budget Sets and Rationalization, Economic Theory, vol. 54, n°3, p. 449-461

Forges F., Haeringer G., Iehlé V. (2013), Appariement : des modèles de Lloyd Shapley à la conception de marchés d'Alvin Roth, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 123, n°5, p. 663-696

Serrano R., Forges F. (2013), Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems, International Game Theory Review, vol. 15, n°2, p. 21

Forges F. (2013), A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 78, n°1, p. 64-71

Vida P., Forges F. (2013), Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk : the Two-Player Case, Theoretical Economics, vol. 8, n°1, p. 95-123

Orzach R., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 47, n°6, p. 760-767

Biran O., Forges F. (2011), Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 73, n°1, p. 52-64

Forges F., Minelli E. (2009), Afriat's theorem for general budget sets, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, n°1, p. 135-145

Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Long persuasion games, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 143, n°1, p. 1-35

Koessler F., Forges F. (2008), Multistage communication with and without verifiable types, International Game Theory Review, vol. 10, n°2, p. 145-164

Forges F., Koessler F. (2008), Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification, Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, n°89, p. 3-61

Von Stengel B., Forges F. (2008), Extensive form correlated equilibrium: definition and computational complexity, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 33, n°4, p. 1002-1022

Forges F. (2007), Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin, Roger Myerson et la théorie des mécanismes, Revue d'économie politique, vol. 117, n°6, p. 873-890

Barbar R., Forges F. (2007), Collusion dans les enchères : quelques apports des jeux coopératifs, Revue Economique, vol. 58, n°5, p. 965-984

Forges F. (2006), Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited, Theory and Decision, vol. 61, n°4, p. 329-344

Forges F. (2006), Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26, n°2, p. 403-419

Forges F., Koessler F. (2005), Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 41, n°7, p. 793-811

Forges F. (2005), The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities, Economie publique, vol. 2, n°17, p. 141-159

Forges F. (2004), The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 47, n°2, p. 135-151

Forges F., Mertens J-F., Vohra R. (2002), The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects, Econometrica, vol. 70, n°5, p. 1865–1892

Heifetz A., Minelli E., Forges F. (2001), Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies, Economic Theory, vol. 18, n°2, p. 349-365

Forges F., Minelli E. (2001), A note on the incentive compatible core, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 98, n°1, p. 179-188

Minelli E., Forges F. (1997), Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 75, n°2, p. 388–406

Chapitres d'ouvrage

Forges F. (1993), Some thoughts on efficiency and information, in Tani, Piero, Frontiers of game theory, Cambridge: MIT press, p. 357

Thisse J-F., Forges F. (1992), Game theory and industrial economics : an introduction, in Norman, George, The new industrial economics : recent developments in industrial organization, oligopoly and game theory, Aldershot: E. Elgar, p. 271

Forges F. (1992), Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum, in Hart, Sergiu, Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Amsterdam: Elsevier, p. 2566

Forges F. (1991), Sunspot equilibrium as a game theoretical solution concept, in Barnett, William A., Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 492

Forges F. (1990), Repeated Games with Incomplete Information, in Tauman, Yair, Game Theory and Applications, San Diego: Academic Press, p. 64-76

Mertens J-F., Forges F. (1988), Stratégies d'entreprises et avantages de la coopération : l'apport de la théorie des jeux, in , Gestion de l'économie de l'entreprise : l'approche quantitative, Bruxelles: De Boeck, p. 492

Communications sans actes

Forges F. (2010), Communication in Bayesian games: Overview of work on implementing mediators in game theory, Decentralized Mechanism Design, Distributed Computing and Cryptography Workshop, Princeton, NJ, États-Unis

Cahiers de recherche

Salomon A., Forges F. (2013), Bayesian Repeated Games, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine, 38 p.

Forges F. (2011), Bayesian games with contracts, Paris, Université Paris- Dauphine, 14 p.

Iehlé V., Forges F. (2010), Essential budgetary information in revealed preference analysis, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine

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