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Elodie Djemai est Maître de conférences en Sciences Economiques à l'Université Paris-Dauphine depuis 2011.
Elle a obtenu son doctorat d'Economie à l'Université Toulouse 1 sous la direction de Jean-Paul Azam. Sa thèse est composée de trois essais sur l'économie du VIH/sida. Ensuite, elle a effectué un séjour postdoctoral au Population Studies Center au sein de l'Université de Michigan.
Ses recherches portent principalement sur des questions de santé, de pauvreté et de démographie dans les pays en développement, et particulièrement en Afrique Subsaharienne.
Arestoff F., Djemaï E. (2016), Women's Empowerment Across the Life Cycle and Generations: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, World Development, 87, p. 70-87
Does female empowerment evolve over the life cycle, and has it changed across generations? We use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys covering a sample of about 191,000 adult women to evaluate the age, period and cohort effects regarding individual attitudes to marital violence. Pseudo-panel data are constructed from repeated cross-sections from five African countries in the 2000s. The estimates show that, over the life cycle, women tend to think that marital violence is less and less justifiable, and that younger cohorts are less likely than older cohorts to view marital violence as justifiable, even controlling for education.
Centorrino S., Djemaï E., Hopfensitz A., Milinski M., Seabright P. (2015), Honest signalling in trust interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earnings opportunities, Evolution and Human Behavior, 36, 1, p. 8-16
We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether to 'send' or 'keep' a lower stake (4 euro) or higher stake (8 euro). Senders (198 participants from Lyon, France) made trust decisions with respect to the recorded clips. If money was sent to the trustee, stakes were tripled and trustees could decide to keep all, two thirds or one half of the tripled stakes. Clips were further rated concerning the genuineness of the displayed smiles. We observe that smiles rated as more genuine strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. We observe a relation between costs and benefits: smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more genuine. Finally, we show that those rated as smiling genuinely return more money on average to senders. An increase of one standard deviation in rating of smile genuineness is associated with an unconditional expected gain of about one dollar and thirty cents to senders in the two trials of the experiment. Potential gains for senders could be significantly increased from taking smiles rated as genuine into account.
D'Albis H., Augeraud-Véron E., Djemaï E., Ducrot A. (2012), The Dispersion of Age Differences between Partners and the Asymptotic Dynamics of the HIV Epidemic, Journal of Biological Dynamics, 6, 2, p. 695-717
In this article, the effect of a change in the distribution of age differences between sexual partners on the dynamics of the HIV epidemic is studied. In a gender and age structured compartmental model, it is shown that if the variance of the distribution is small enough, an increase in this variance strongly increases the basic reproduction number. Moreover, if the variance is large enough, the mean age difference barely affects the basic reproduction number. We therefore conclude that the local stability of the disease-free equilibrium relies more on the variance than on the mean.
Djemaï E. (2010), HIV-Related Risk Taking Behavior and Income Uncertainty : Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 59ème congrés de l'Association Française de Science Économique, Paris, FRANCE
This paper addresses the issue of the positive observed relationship be-tween GDP and HIV prevalence in Sub-Saharan Africa. We examine therole of the volatility of GDP per capita in lowering the incentives to investin self-protection and, empirically, in the spread of the epidemic. Using apanel dataset of Sub-Saharan African countries over the 1990-2007 time pe-riod and a dynamic panel data framework, a more unstable GDP distributionis found to accelerate the spread of AIDS. The positive relationship betweenHIV prevalence and economic volatility is robust to the inclusion of additionalcontrol variables and to the de nition of the measure of GDP volatility.
Djemaï E. (2009), How do Roads Spread Knowledge, Condoms and HIV/AIDS in Africa ?, 26èmes Journées de Microéconomie appliquée, Dijon, France
Given the low condom use and high prevalence in some African countries, this paper addresses the question of whether these evidences are driven by a supply-side or a demandside issue. The role of road infrastructures on HIV/AIDS outcomes is investigated using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys in six African countries. Empirical ndings suggest that road infrastructures increase the quality of the knowledge about HIV transmission and the availability of condoms, and hence reduce the cost of self-protection. Even if individuals are provided the materials required to change their sexual behaviors and their HIV risk taking behaviors, we found that they do not necessarily decide to use all the materials available. Some protective measures are preferred to others. HIV-testing is facilitated in cities crossed by a major transportation road. People are found more likely to use condom use when living in accessible areas while they are also more likely to handle risky behaviors by have sex with casual partner without condom. The likelihood of HIV-infection remains high even for individuals who have no supply de ciency since they are willing to extent the size of their sexual network.
Arestoff F., Djemaï E. (2013), Women's empowerment across the life cycle and generations: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, DIAL Document de travail, Paris, Université Paris-Dauphine
L'autonomisation des femmes, leur "empowerment", évolue-t-elle tout au long de leur cycle de vie ?S'est-elle renforcée au fil des générations ? A partir de données issues des Enquêtes Démographiques et de Santé portant sur un échantillon de 191 000 femmes adultes, nous estimons les effets d'âge, de période et de cohorte sur le refus de la violence conjugale, pris comme mesure de l'empowerment.Nous construisons un pseudo-panel en mobilisant des données de plusieurs vagues d'enquêtes consécutives menées dans cinq pays d'Afrique Sub-Saharienne au cours des années 2000. Lesestimations montrent qu'en terme de cycle de vie, plus les femmes vieillissent, moins elles considèrentla violence conjugale comme justifiable. Parallèlement, en terme de générations, les femmes des plus jeunes cohortes ont une moindre probabilité d'accepter la violence conjugale, à niveau d'éducation donné. Dans la décomposition Age-Période-Cohorte, les effets de l'âge et de la période d'enquête se révèlent être les plus importants. On montre également que les effets de l'âge sont en partie expliquéspar les changements de la situation des femmes sur le marché du travail, la composition de leur ménage et leur rôle de parent.
Does female empowerment evolve over the life cycle, and has it changed across generations? We use data from the Demographic and Health Surveys covering a sample of about 191,000 adult women to evaluate the age, period and cohort effect regarding individual attitudes to marital violence. Pseudopaneldata are constructed from repeated cross-sections from five African countries in the 2000s. The estimates show that, over the life cycle, women tend to think that marital violence is less and less justifiable, and that younger cohorts are less likely than older cohorts to view marital violence as justifiable, even controlling for education. In the full age-period-cohort decomposition, the age andperiod effects are the most important. Age effects are driven by changes in labor-force status, household composition and parenthood.
Seabright P., Milinski M., Hopfensitz A., Djemaï E., Centorrino S. (2011), Smiling is a Costly Signal of Cooperation Opportunities : Experimental Evidence from a Trust Game, IDEI Working Paper Series, Toulouse, Institut d'Économie Industrielle, Université Toulouse 1, 44
We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation : smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal : those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees : less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share : it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer.
Djemaï E. (2009), How do Roads Spread AIDS in Africa ? A Critique of the Received Policy Wisdom, TSE working paper series, Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, 53
This paper empirically analyzes the influence of road proximity on HIV- infection using geographical data on road infrastructure and the Demographic and Health Surveys collected in six African countries. Firstly we show that living in proximity to a major road increases the individual risk of infection. This observed relationship is found to be sensitive to the use of the road and to be robust after correcting for potential selection bias related to the non random placement of people. Secondly, our ndings reveal that road infrastructure improves the level of HIV/AIDS-knowledge and facilitates access to condoms, providing no support to the hypothesis that HIV-infection is purely due to ignorance and misfortune. Thirdly, we find that the increased risk of infection is driven by a higher likelihood of engaging in casual sexual partner- ships that more than o sets the e ffect of the increased use of condoms.
Djemaï E. (2009), Risk Taking of HIV-Infection and Income Uncertainty : Empirical Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, TSE working paper series, Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, 41
This paper questions the positive relationship between HIV prevalence and income in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this paper, we hypothesize that a greater economic instability would reduce the incentives to engage in self-protective behaviors inducing people to increasingly take the risk of HIV-infection and hence causing a rise in HIV prevalence. We provide a simple model to stress on the e ects of an increase in income risk in the incentives for protection. We test the prediction using a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980-2001. It is shown that the epidemic is widespread in countries that experience a great instability in gross domestic product over the whole period. When introducing income instability, GDP per capita is devoid of predictive power and the puzzle of the positive relationship between income and prevalence in Africa is lifted. Additional nding states that the risk taking of HIV-infection increases when the individuals are facing frequent and large crop shocks.